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NONCONSENSUAL STERILIZATION OF THE
MENTALLY DISABLED IN NORTH
CAROLINA: AN ETHICS CRITIQUE
OF THE STATUTORY
STANDARD AND ITS JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION
Joe Zumpano-Canto, J.D., M.P.H.
In North Carolina, the mentally disabled remain subject to nonconsen-
sual1 sterilization pursuant to statutory authority. The primary goal of
this article is to provide an ethics critique of both the North Carolina
statute and its application by the courts. Four arguments support the po-
sition that the statute and the relevant case law unethically infringe upon
the sexual autonomy2 of the mentally disabled. First, eugenic3 provisions
1. The North Carolina statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to 35-50 (1995), is often
referred to as an "involuntary" or "nonconsensual" sterilization statute because the state
can pursue sterilization when the individual is either unable to consent or when the proce-
dure goes against the individual's consent. Although the statute uses the specific term
"mentally retarded," this article employs the term "mentally disabled" as some may find
the former to be derogatory.
2. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 68 (1989) ("[T]he core idea of personal autonomy is ... personal rule of the self
while remaining free from both controlling interferences by others and personal limita-
tions, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent meaningful choice").
The definition of sexual autonomy for the purposes of this article will be a subcategory
of the "core idea of personal autonomy" as defined by Beauchamp and Childress. Id.
Thus, paralleling the Beauchamp and Childress definition, sexual autonomy is personal
rule of the self that remains free from the controlling interferences and the personal limita-
tions that prevent meaningful choices regarding sexual intercourse and subjects associated
with the sexual act. The sexual act is a vehicle for procreation, and thus the first step in
parenting one's genetic child. In addition, it is a fundamental component of the marriage
relationship. Thus, procreation (for the parenting of one's genetic child) and marriage are
subjects encompassed by the term "sexual autonomy."
It is important to note, when discussing constitutional issues, that the term "sexual au-
tonomy" as defined in this article is encompassed by the terms "right of privacy" or "lib-
erty." The terms "right of privacy" and "liberty" on the constitutional level, as with the
term "sexual autonomy" on the ethical level, include procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); parenting, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and mar-
riage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). This article is an ethics critique, rather than a
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of the statute constitute ethically inappropriate grounds for sacrificing
sexual autonomy "for the public good." Second, the statute's procedures
for protecting the sexual autonomy of the mentally disabled individual
are inadequate. Third, the statute disproportionately infringes upon the
autonomy of the mentally disabled poor. Fourth, the statute and corre-
sponding case law have the effect of "objectifying" the mentally disabled
woman and allowing cultural attitudes toward women to play a large role
in the sterilization decision.
The secondary goal of this work is to provide an ethical model for non-
consensual sterilization of the mentally disabled in North Carolina. This
model serves only to address the ethical issues raised by the North Caro-
lina statute; it is not intended to serve as a model for nonconsensual ster-
ilization in other jurisdictions.
I. AUTONOMY AS A CONTROLLING PRINCIPLE
When analyzing the ethical issues involved in sterilization of the men-
tally disabled, the autonomy interests of the mentally disabled individual
should receive primary consideration.4 Subordination of sexual auton-
constitutional analysis, of the North Carolina statute and case law. Thus, it uses the term
"sexual autonomy" rather than "right of privacy" or "liberty."
3, See Gerard S. Letterie & William F. Fox, Legal Aspects of Involuntary Steriliza-
tion, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY 391, 392 (1990). In 1883, Sir Francis Galton was the first to
introduce the term "eugenics" in the literature. Galton defined the concept as: "(1) en-
couraging the propagation of useful, productive members of society (positive eugenics) and
(2) reducing the numbers of unfit persons in society (negative eugenics)." Id. at 392. Let-
terie and Fox assert that the current use of the term "eugenics" is usually limited to the
second prong of Galton's definition. Id.
4. In order to give primary consideration to the autonomy interests of the mentally
disabled, one must first determine what autonomy interests a mentally disabled individual
holds. Tom L. Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters write that:
Autonomy ... has been analyzed in terms of freedom from external constraint
and the presence of critical internal capacities to self-governance .... To respect
an autonomous agent is to recognize with due appreciation that person's capaci-
ties and perspective, including his or her right to hold certain views, to make
certain choices, and to take certain actions based on personal values and beliefs.
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 28 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 3rd
ed. 1989). Beauchamp and Childress consider the mentally disabled to be persons with
"diminished autonomy." BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 68. Beauchamp and
Walters define a person with "diminished autonomy" as one who is "highly dependent on
others, less than self-reliant, and, in at least some respect, incapable of choosing a plan on
the basis of controlled deliberations." Beauchamp & Walters, supra, at 29. The words
"diminished autonomy" imply that the mentally disabled may have a certain degree of
autonomy.
Two inquiries must be made, when interpreting the language in the above statements, in
order to determine whether the "diminished autonomy" of the mentally disabled individ-
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omy to alleged social interests is incompatible with educational efforts
providing the mentally disabled with an environment that stresses auton-
omy.5 Current educational programs pursue "normalization," a process
by which mentally disabled individuals learn to develop skills that enable
them to live independent and self-sufficient lives.6 "Normalization" pro-
grams have placed an emphasis on sexual autonomy because sexual activ-
ity is viewed as an integral part of an independent and self-sufficient life.
7
Philosophical approaches toward sterilization that subordinate sexual au-
tonomy to society's alleged interests run counter to the process of "nor-
ual is nonetheless sufficient to encompass a given issue facing her. First, there must be an
assessment of whether an individual has the "capacities... to hold certain views and make
certain choices." CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 28 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy
Walters eds., 3rd ed. 1989). Second, there must be an assessment of whether these "capaci-
ties" are sufficient for making an autonomous decision regarding the given issue.
In making the second assessment, Ruth Faden asserts that mental disability is a matter of
degree, and therefore the capacities of the mentally disabled individuals will fall on a "con-
tinuum." Interview with Ruth Faden, Senior Research Scholar, Kennedy Institute of Eth-
ics at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 15, 1994). Faden states that some of
the mentally disabled on this "continuum" may not have any capacity to make choices;
therefore they may not have any autonomy interest in the given issue facing them. Id. She
adds that at a given threshold, some of mentally disabled may have capacities further along
the "continuum" and thus will be able to understand the issues facing them and to express
a preference. Id. Finally, at another threshold further along the continuum, some mentally
disabled individuals will have the ability to understand the issues facing them and will be
able to express a preference that considers their greater life view or plan. Id. Faden asserts
that policy-makers draw lines that place "competency" to make an autonomous choice
with regard to different medical procedures on different points along on the continuum.
Id. In applying this analytical framework to sexual autonomy, this article espouses the
position that an autonomy interest regarding procreation and parenting of one's genetic
child is present if the capacities described infra note 80 are met. An autonomy interest in
marriage is present if the capacities described infra note 93, are met.
5. The words "independence" and "autonomy" have been used interchangeably. For
example, Beauchamp and Childress have stated: "A person's autonomy is his or her inde-
pendence, self-reliance, and self-contained ability to decide." TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 56 (1979).
6. Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights
and Family Privacy, 1986 DuKE L.J. 806, 815 (1986).
7. Id at 815-16. According to some commentators, "[s]ignificant advances continue
to be made in normalizing the quality and style of life of the mentally retarded. These
changes in societal attitude have provided new opportunities for mentally retarded individ-
uals to enjoy more normal and satisfying sexual experiences." Allan Chamberlain et al.,
Issues in Fertility Control for Mentally Retarded Female Adolescents: I. Sexual Activity, Sex-
ual Abuse, and Contraception, 73 PEDIATRICS 445, 445 (1984).
Science has documented that the mentally disabled are capable of enjoying "normal and
satisfying sexual experiences." Id. at 445. One study revealed that there where no signifi-
cant differences between the sexual experiences of mildly mentally disabled children and
their non-disabled counterparts in the 15 to 19 year old age group. Id. at 450.
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malization."8 These approaches constitute an unacceptable return to the
distancing and isolation from "mainstream" society previously exper-
ienced by the mentally disabled.9
Two approaches that often subordinate the sexual autonomy of the
mentally disabled to society's alleged interests include the eugenics based
rationales and the "best interests" rationales. A eugenics approach to
sterilization of the mentally disabled would subordinate sexual autonomy
for the sake of preventing genetic transmission of mental deficiencies. 10
8. Normalization attempts to "mainstream" the mentally disabled individual by
"making available ... patterns or conditions of everyday life which are as close as possible
to the norms and patterns of the mainstream of society." Scott, supra note 6, at 815 n.28
(citing Nirje, Symposium on Normalization: The Normalization Principle - Implications
and Comments, 16 BRIT. J. MENTAL SUBNORMALITY 62, 62 (1970)). An emphasis on sex-
ual autonomy contributes to the "mainstreaming" sought through normalization because
"freedom and privacy in social and sexual relationships may be as important to mentally
disabled persons as to others." Id. at 816. In contrast, subordinating sexual autonomy to
alleged societal interests does not bring the mentally disabled "as close as possible to the
norms and patterns of mainstream society," but instead isolates the individual from society
by removing one of the "patterns or conditions of everyday life" that normalization seeks
to introduce. Id. at 815-16 n.28.
9. Elizabeth Scott asserts that "[tihe notion that mentally disabled persons are sexual
beings is only recently gaining acceptance.... In the past, dealing with sexual behavior was
viewed as a problem: usually, preventing sexual contact among residents or participants in
programs ... for mentally retarded persons was standard policy." Scott, supra note 6, at
816 n.29.
A sterilization decision that subordinates sexual autonomy in favor of an alleged societal
interest indicates that the decision maker necessarily views sexual behavior between men-
tally disabled individuals as a "problem." The "problem" would be the "harm" caused to
society by the exercise of sexual autonomy. Use of sterilization to solve the "problem"
parallels the isolation imposed on the mentally disabled in the past to prevent their sexual
activity. One point of interest arises with John P. Radford's assertion that until the 1920's,
even eugenicists viewed sterilization as a more extreme option than isolation for solving
the "problem" of genetic transmission of mental disability: "Many eugenicists feared that
advocacy of sterilization would gain for the movement an image of extremism, which might
prevent the widespread acceptance of its viewpoint." John P. Radford, Sterilization Versus
Segregation: Control of the "Feebleminded," 1900 -1938, 33 Soc. SCI. MED. 449, 453 (1991).
10. Throughout the 19th century, eugenic theory was the basis for most state legisla-
tion. Jeff Goldhar, The Sterilization of Women with an Intellectual Disability, 10 TASMANIA
L. REV. 157, 161-165 (1990). Goldhar states that in 1931, 24 states in the union had laws
with eugenic purposes. Id. at 163. The subordination of "sexual autonomy" to the state
interest under the eugenics rationale is best captured by Justice Holme's infamous declara-
tion in Buck v. Bell: "It is better for all the world if instead of waiting to execute degenera-
tive offspring for crime, or let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles is
enough." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
Though Buck has been limited by later Supreme Court decisions such as Skinner v.
Oklahbnia, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the eugenic state interest elucidated by Holmes above has
not been ruled unconstitutional and continues to underlie the North Carolina statute and
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The first reason for rejecting eugenics based rationales for sterilization of
the mentally disabled is that the underlying scientific basis for such ratio-
nales has been discredited. The following excerpt explains: "Most of the
profoundly retarded are incapable of reproduction because of physical or
genetic disabilities, and others remain in protected environments that
make sterilization unnecessary. Thus, the number of retarded who lack
the ability to consent and who may need involuntary sterilization is
small."" In addition, data shows that in most instances children born to
mentally retarded individuals will not have genetic defects.' 2 Science has
established that less than five percent of mental retardation is heredi-
tary.13 Thus, one can conclude that the decision to allow sterilization of
the mentally disabled, when made without precise knowledge that a de-
fective gene will be transmitted, sacrifices autonomy and, in the majority
of cases provides no "benefit" to society's gene pool.
A second reason for rejecting the eugenics rationale is that the decision
to allow sterilization in the small number of cases where transmission of a
genetic defect is scientifically predictable is ethically flawed. Ninety per-
cent of the mentally disabled are born to non-mentally disabled parents.' 4
To target the mentally disabled solely on eugenic grounds, without target-
ing normal parents who will genetically transmit mental disability, would
constitute groundless discrimination. Because society places the "sexual
autonomy" of non-mentally disabled parents above eugenics concerns,
such concerns should not infringe upon the sexual autonomy of the men-
tally disabled.
Although eugenic principles underlie provisions in some state statutes,
most states have adopted statutes and judicial standards espousing a
"best interests" analysis. 5 This approach generally professes to consider
the "best interests" of the patient, but also usually considers the best in-
its corresponding case law. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. The critique of
eugenics that follows, however, does not involve a constitutional analysis, as that is beyond
the scope of this article.
11. Sandra S. Coleman, Comment, Involuntary Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded:
Blessing or Burden?, 25 S.D. L. REV. 55, 67 (1980).
12. Kathryn Ann Calibey, Comment, Nonconsensual Sterilization of the Mentally Re-
tarded - Analysis of Standards of Judicial Determinations, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 689,
696 (1981). .
13. Coleman, supra note 11, at 60.
14. Id.
15. Richard Estacio, Comment, Sterilization of the Mentally Disabled in Pennskylvania:
Three Generations without Legislative Guidance are Enough, 92 DICK. L. REv. 409, 420
(1988).
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terests of society. 16 The "best interests" approach, as the eugenics ap-
proach, often subordinates the sexual autonomy of the mentally disabled
to the interests of society.17 In so doing, the "best interests" approach
provides a return to the unacceptable distancing and isolation of the men-
tally disabled from "mainstream" society, which they experienced prior
to the "normalization" trend.
II. NORTH CAROLINA'S INVASION OF SEXUAL AUTONOMY
A. The North Carolina Statute and Eugenics
North Carolina is the only state that requires public officials, specifi-
cally directors of state institutions and county directors of social services,
to petition a court for the sterilization of the mentally disabled. Two pro-
visions describing this duty are eugenic. First, the statute requires the
public official to petition for sterilization when she believes that steriliza-
tion would be for the "public good.""8 Second, the statute requires the
public official to petition for sterilization when she believes that the men-
tally disabled individual is likely to procreate a child with a physical,
mental, or nervous system disease.19 Case law has interpreted these two
provisions as providing a compelling state interest that allows the state to
infringe upon the sexual autonomy of the mentally disabled. In one case,
the court indicated that in
[a]cting for the public good, the state, in the exercise of its police
16. Id.
17. Richard Estacio asserts: "Unfortunately, those statutes which exhibit a concern for
societal interests tend to subordinate the rights of the mentally disabled individual when-
ever the interests of the person and the interests of society appears to be at odds." Id.
Estacio supports his claim by citing IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3901 - 39-3910 (1977) (providing
for sterilization of patients unfit to raise children), Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to 19
(1972) (balancing the best interests of society and the patient), and N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-
36 to 35-50 (1995) (allowing sterilization for the "public good"). Id. at 420 n.63.
18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-39(2)(1995). The statute provides that "[iut shall be the
duty of such petitioner to institute proceedings... [w]hen in his opinion it is for the public
good that such patient, resident, . . . or noninstitutional individual be sterilized." Id. The
"petitioner" mentioned in this provision refers to directors of state institutions, county
directors of social services, or other public officials acting as such directors. Id. §§ 35-36,
35-37.
19. The statute provides:
It ,shall be the duty of such petitioner promptly to institute such proceedings as
provided by this article . . .[w]hen in his opinion such patient, resident of an
institution, or noninstitutional individual would be likely, unless sterilized, to pro-
create a child or children would have a tendency to serious physical, mental or
nervous disease.
Id. § 35-39(3) (1995).
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power, may impose reasonable restrictions upon the natural and
constitutional rights of its citizens.... It is the function of the
legislature, and its duty as well, to enact appropriate legislation
to protect the public and preserve the race from the known ef-
fects of the procreation of mentally deficient children by the
mentally deficient.2"
The court followed this comment with a direct quote of the statement of
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Buck v. Bell that
supports eugenics." Therefore, the state's "compelling" interest was
grounded firmly in eugenic theory.22
The court in In re Truesdell tried to ameliorate eugenic based infringe-
ment upon sexual autonomy by stating that "minimal best interests stan-
dards are constitutionally required" before sterilization can be ordered.23
Yet, as Fischman asserts, such a stance cannot be reconciled with the lan-
guage of the statute. The statute specifically requires a district judge to
authorize sterilization when the respondent would procreate a child likely
to have a serious deficiency.24 After In re Truesdell, North Carolina
courts may face a situation where the eugenic statutory provision upheld
in In re Truesdell conflicts directly with the "best interest" of a mentally
disabled patient.25 Thus, by upholding eugenics as a basis for steriliza-
20. In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (N.C. 1976)(citing In re Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d 171
(Neb. 1968)). The "compelling interest" of the state to prevent the birth of children with
inheritable mental deficiency has been cited in later North Carolina cases. See e.g. In re
Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793, 805 (N.C. 1983).
21. "It is better for all the world if instead of waiting to execute degenerative offspring
for crime, or let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are mani-
festly unfit from continuing their kind .... Three generations of imbeciles is enough." Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
22. Aside from the argument that solely targeting the mentally disabled for steriliza-
tion constitutes groundless discrimination, the language of the North Carolina statute and
case law pose an ominous threat to autonomy by not requiring scientific proof of genetic
transferability of a genetic deficiency before authorizing sterilization. Robert H. Shaw III,
Note, Legislative Naivete in Involuntary Sterilization Laws, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1064,
1065-66 (1976).
23. Joel Alan Fischman, In re Truesdell: North Carolina Adopts Two New and Conflict-
ing Standards for Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1196, 1208
(1986) (citing In re Truesdell, 329 S.E.2d at 635).
24. Id. at 1208 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43 (1995)).
25. Id. at 1212. Fischman describes the possible conflict as follows:
These questions will arise most notably in cases in which a court finds that the
statutory test is satisfied, but that sterilization is not in the respondent's best inter-
ests, or that sterilization is in the respondent's best interests, but that the statutory
test is not satisfied. In re Truesdell provides little guidance as to which setiof
standards should take precedence in such cases.
I at 1209.
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tion, In re Truesdell has provided an opportunity for the North Carolina
legislature to rethink its position by requiring some consideration of a
minimal "best interest" standard.26
Eugenic principles in the statute and case law should be abandoned in
favor of the sexual autonomy interest of the mentally disabled. As was
argued in the preceding section, the science underlying eugenic based
sterilization of the mentally disabled has been discredited. In addition,
there is no ethically acceptable basis for targeting the mentally disabled
for sterilization solely on eugenic grounds. In contrast, a decision by a
third party to sterilize a mentally disabled individual may forever deny
that person the opportunity for any expression of "sexual autonomy"
such as procreation and parenting one's own genetic child.
B. Inadequacy of Procedures Safeguarding Autonomy
Three factors render inadequate the statute's procedures for protecting
the autonomy of the mentally disabled individual. First, even if the indi-
vidual is found able to consent, the statute does not consider her consent
or objection to be controlling. Second, the sterilization petition fails to
adequately protect autonomy. Finally, the statute fails to guarantee full
exploration of the individual's capacity to enjoy expressions of sexual au-
tonomy before sterilization is ordered.
1. Consent not Controlling
The statute requires that the district court judge disregard the mentally
disabled individual's lack of consent or objection to sterilization and au-
thorize the procedure if she finds evidence that the individual would
probably be unable to care for a child or is likely to procreate a child with
serious physical, mental, or nervous system disease.27 Ninety percent of
all mentally retarded persons are only "mildly" retarded and accordingly
are capable of withholding or granting consent to sterilization.28 In light
of this statistic, the state is left with a great deal of room to infringe upon
the autonomy of mentally disabled individuals.
Unlike North Carolina, other jurisdictions will uphold the decision of a
mentally disabled individual who has been found competent to consent or
object. In Oregon, for example, if an individual has the capacity to con-
sent, but instead objects to the sterilization, then the court will deny the
1
26. Vd. at 1212.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43 (1995).
28. Coleman, supra note 11, at 67.
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petition for sterilization.29 Other states will not even proceed with a
"best interests" analysis unless it is first shown that the mentally disabled
individual lacks the capacity to consent.3°
2. Petition Procedures
The first flaw in the petition procedures is that the statute fails to re-
quire expert analysis of the individual's capacity to consent. Although
the mentally disabled individual's consent is not controlling, courts may
find it relevant.31 Thus, in order to protect the autonomy of the mentally
disabled individual, the court must properly assess capacity to consent.
Autonomy is best protected by involving experts who accurately can
assess the individual's capacity in the process. 32 The statute assumes by
not requiring such expert analysis that the public official petitioning for
sterilization is either qualified or will choose qualified personnel to assess
the individual's capacity to consent. Public officials without special train-
ing erroneously may decide that a patient lacks capacity to consent. If
the petitioner recognizes her own lack of expertise, then she may consult
a physician or psychologist to assess capacity to consent. As Elizabeth
Scott asserts, however, "most physicians, including psychiatrists, have
very limited expertise in mental retardation; most psychologists have only
marginally more. A specific designation of expertise and training in
mental retardation would promote more accurate assessments of compe-
tency .. .
Several states protect the autonomy of the individual by requiring ex-
pert participation in assessing capacity to consent. Connecticut courts re-
quire evidence regarding incapacity to consent from at least three court
29. Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization of Women, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
122, 152 n.206 (1993). In addition to Oregon, Cepko lists several states, including Maine
and Connecticut, in which the patient's ability to consent is the central issue in a steriliza-
tion hearing. Id. at 152 n.204-207.
30. Id. at 153.
31. The statute requires that the petition include a statement of consent or objection
from the individual as well as her parents or guardians. If the individual is incapable of
consent, then the statute requires a certification by the petitioner that the procedure has
been explained to the person upon whom the operation is to be performed. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 35-40 (1995).
32. Scott, supra note 6, at 849.
33. Id. The American Academy of Pediatrics advocates this view, stating: "Obtaining
the assistance of professionals trained in communicating with persons who are mentally
handicapped is essential in seeking to assess capacity." AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIAT-
RICS COMMITTEE ON BIOETHICS, Sterilization of Women Who are Mentally Handicapped,
85 PEDIATRICS 868, 869 (1990).
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appointed impartial experts who have personally observed the individual
within the last twelve months before they will find that an individual lacks
capacity to consent.3 4 Maine requires a court to appoint at least two im-
partial experts in either the development disability or mental health sci-
ences, and at least one psychologist who has evaluated the patient to
assess the individual's capacity.35 In contrast, courts in North Carolina
have held that the mentally disabled individual has no constitutional right
that would require the court to appoint and to pay a medical expert to
examine and testify on behalf of the mentally disabled individual.3 6
The second flaw in the petition procedures is the failure to safeguard
sexual autonomy from possible conflicts of interest between the petition-
ing public official and the parents or guardian of the mentally disabled
individual. 37 As a petitioner, the public official's conflict of interest is
three-fold. If the petitioner is a director of an institution for the mentally
disabled, then pregnancy and menstrual cycles may place an increased
burden of care on her institution and its staff: "Pregnancy or preserving
reproductive function may significantly increase the difficulty of caring
for the patient; an infant would make further demands on the same care-
taker or necessitate the shift of that responsibility to other individuals or
institutions.
38
The literature reflects concerns that public officials may seek steriliza-
tion to prevent or alleviate an increased burden of care. 39 The American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists states that "the primary or
34. Cepko, supra note 29, at 152 n.204.
35. Id. at 152.
36. In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 311 (N.C. 1976).
37. For purposes of this article the term "conflict of interest" refers to a situation in
which a public official, parent, or guardian has a personal interest that potentially conflicts
with the sexual autonomy interests of the mentally disabled individual.
It is important to note that this subsection of the paper does not suggest that people who
are incapable of making autonomous choices should be treated as capable of making those
choices without the interference of a third party. Instead, this subsection posits that when
determining whether an individual is capable of making autonomous choices, an assess-
ment of capacity to consent must be free from the conflicts of interest held by such third
parties. If exploration, free from these conflicts of interests, reveals that the individual is
not capable of consent or objection, then there may exist a role for a third party in the
decisionmaking process. This role should be limited, however, by the principles in Part II
B.3. of this article.
38. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS COMMITTrEE ON BIOETHICS, supra note 33,
at 871.
39. This concern is not exclusive to the United States. Other western countries have
voiced similar concerns. For example, two British authors write: "The issues relating to
both community care and 'parental wishes lead to another widely voiced criticism: that such
sterilizations are a matter of convenience for those who care for women ... rather than in
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contributing indications for sterilization based on presumed or antici-
pated hardships to others should be viewed with great reservation ....
Roberta Cepko expresses skepticism toward sterilization by hysterectomy
because it provides an "immediate, tangible relief to the [mentally dis-
abled] woman's caretaker, by relieving the caretaker of personal hygiene
burdens.",41 Upon analyzing several cases, Cepko concludes that "courts
are too willing to rest hysterectomy authorizations on the ground of med-
ical need, overlooking the incidental benefits that may have motivated
parents and institutional staffs to seek authorization of hysterectomies.,"42
As a director of an institution or social services program, the petitioner
also may encounter budgetary and political pressure to prevent
pregnancies of the mentally disabled through the use of sterilization.
Political pressure may stem from the state's interest in protecting its purse
from increased costs of care and other costs associated with children who
may become future wards of the state.
Both the North Carolina case law and statute place a high premium on
protecting the state's purse from the procreation of children who may
become wards of the state. The North Carolina statute requires a public
official to petition for sterilization when the petitioner is of the opinion
that the mentally disabled individual will have a child for whom she is
unable to care.43 One commentator has stated that a basic purpose of
this provision is the prevention of "an increased number of charges to the
welfare roles." 4
The North Carolina judiciary has held that "[t]he people of North Car-
olina ... have a right to prevent the procreation of children who will
become a burden on the State."45 Another commentator states that, by
deduction, one must assume that the interest protected here is financial.46
Political pressure to reduce costs of care and budgetary constraints have
been implicated in the compromising of sexual autonomy for the men-
her interests." Robert Lee & Derek Morgan, Sterilization and Mental Handicap: Sapping
the Strength of the State?, 15 J.L. & Soc'y 229, 239 (1988).
40. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS COMMITFEE ON BIOETHICS, supra note 33,
at 868.
41. Cepko, supra note 29, at 162.
42. Id. at 163.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-39 (1995).
44. Estacio, supra note 15, at 421.
45. In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d at 312.
46. Shaw, supra note 22, at 1072 n.52.
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tally disabled in Great Britain.4 7 Coupled with the large discretion be-
stowed upon public officials in bringing sterilization petitions, budgetary
constraints and political pressure make it possible that the same compro-
mising of the rights of the mentally disabled will occur in North
Carolina.48
Yet another conflict of interest that may lead institutional directors to
petition for sterilization is fear of liability for offspring resulting from
rape in their institution.49 Directors may seek sterilization, in lieu of
spending resources to prevent rape in the institutions, as an easy way to
avoid liability for future offspring. Cepko argues that use of sterilization
to avoid rape related pregnancy is often not in the best interest of the
mentally disabled individual because pregnancy may be the only evidence
that the mentally disabled individual is being raped.5" Thus, court or-
dered sterilization could facilitate undetected rape, and thus would run
against the interests of the mentally disabled.51 Cepko cites several cases
where institutional authorities "encourage[d] parents to sterilize their [in-
stitutionalized] daughters for the convenience of the staff and to prevent
47. Robert Lee and Derek Morgan wrote about the case of the British woman who
was sterilized to avoid pregnancy. The following excerpt summarizes that article:
The location of mentally handicapped people in the community was always likely
to prove especially costly, and it is beyond argument that the whole process has
been massively under resourced. Jeanette's [the individual who was sterilized]
vulnerability is a consequence of this; she is but one victim, one hostage to for-
tunes which are redirected away from mental health care.
Lee & Morgan, supra note 39, at 242.
48. Robert Shaw has been especially critical of the large discretion bestowed upon
petitioners by the statute, and the statute's lack of adequate safeguards:
Under the new statutory scheme an individual may be recommended for steriliza-
tion and the operation carried out under court order without any positive finding
by a qualified individual or group that such an operation is in fact justifiable. The
initial decision to sterilize is not based on scientific evidence that a defect is inher-
itable, or alternatively, on positive facts supporting a finding of parental unfitness,
but on the opinion of the petitioning county social services director or director of
a state institution. The statute does not articulate how these officials, individuals
who might not possess any medical or scientific expertise, are qualified to deter-
mine effectively the inheritability of a particular defect.
Shaw, supra note 22, at 1076.
49. Cepko, supra note 29, at 142.
50. Id.
51. Id. This viewpoint is supported by stories in the public media. In one case, "the
alleged attack went unnoticed until the woman showed signs of pregnancy several months,
later." Terry Wilson, Jury Clears Rape Suspect in Nursing Home Attack, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
15, 1993, at 3. See also Kate Stone Lombardi, Rape and the Mentally Retarded, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 1993, at WC1.
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liability for offspring resulting from rape."52 In re M.K.R. involved a ster-
ilization petition for a thirteen year old girl. 3 The authorities at her
school suggested that parents allow her to be sterilized in order to avoid
pregnancy because she was in constant danger of being "assaulted and
ravished."54
In allowing parents to petition for sterilization of their children, the
statute fails to consider that parents and guardians face a conflict of inter-
est.55 Parents of noninstitutionalized individuals may view sterilization as
the answer to an increased burden of care. Most jurisdictions presume
that the parent's interest in preventing the inconvenience associated with
menstrual hygiene and unwanted pregnancy conflicts with their child's
interests.5 6
One study surveying parents of severely mentally disabled individuals
revealed that fourteen percent found that the difficulties in managing
menstruation constitute a proper basis for authorizing sterilization.57 A
federal court recognized this conflicting interest when it declared uncon-
stitutional a former provision of the North Carolina statute requiring
public officials to file sterilization petitions upon a parent's request: "We
think such confidence in all next of kin and all legal guardians is mis-
placed, and that the unstated premises of competency to decide to force
initiation of the proceeding and never failing fidelity to the interest of the
retarded person are invalid."58 North Carolina case law, however, re-
flects a different attitude. Earlier in 1976, in In re Moore, the North Car-
olina Supreme Court upheld then current provisions of the statute and
stated that "[the mentally disabled child's] mother unquestionably is in a
52. Cepko, supra note 29, at 142.
53. Id. at 142 n.134 (citing In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d. 467 (Mo. 1974)).
54. In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d. at 468.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36, 35-37 (1995).
56. Scott, supra note 6, at 821-22, 845, 847. Although Scott's autonomy model pro-
vides a greater role for parents than do most state models, Scott clearly states that this
presumption is valid when the mentally disabled individual has an autonomy interest in
procreation. Id. at 847.
57. M. Bambrick & G.E. Roberts, Sterilization of People with a Mental Handicap: The
Views of Parents, 35 J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY REs. 353, 359 (1991).
58. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 451,
456 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (emphasis omitted). See also In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d
635, 640 (Wash. 1980) (stating that "consent of a parent or guardian is a questionable or
inadequate basis for sterilization"); In re Eberhardy, 307 N.W.2d 881, 897 (Wis. 1981) (stat-
ing "[tihose who normally would speak for the incompetent-parents, guardians, or even
social workers-may in actuality speak, consciously or unconsciously, in their own inter-
ests"); Fischman, supra note 23, at 1205.
92 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:79
position to know what is best for the future of her child." 59 Later cases,
relying on the authority of In re Moore, have failed to address the role of
parents petitioning and consenting for sterilization of their mentally dis-
abled children.6"
As in the case of the public petitioner, parents may view sterilization as
a means of preventing increased costs of care due to pregnancy or men-
strual cycles. Lucille Wolf and Donald Zarfas revealed that parents' atti-
tudes toward sterilization are "pragmatic" and affected by the practical
considerations of rearing children.6' The authors acknowledged parents'
concerns regarding the results of heterosexual contacts by their mentally
disabled children and concluded that "[p]arents of retarded persons have
the right to an old age free from the care, supervision, and financial re-
sponsibility of caring for grandchildren."'62 The authors' statement re-
garding parental interests, however, is colored by the study's revelation
that seventy-one percent of parents favored involuntary sterilization of
their mentally disabled children.6" This figure takes on added signifi-
cance when coupled with the study's conclusion that sixty-four percent of
parents felt no need for involving a legally authorized third party in the
decision to sterilize if their physician already concurred with their sterili-
zation decision.64 Together, these figures represent attitudes that reflect a
disregard for patient autonomy.
Coupled with the large procedural discretion65 remaining in the statute,
the above mentioned conflicts of interest create several ethical concerns.
The conflicts of interest may constitute the underlying purpose of a peti-
tion for sterilization by a public official or a parent. 66 By allowing a peti-
tion based solely on the discretionary concerns of public officials and
59. In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d at 316.
60. See North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. State, 420 F. Supp. 451
(M.D.N.C. 1976). See also In re Johnson, 263 S.E.2d 805, 808 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
61. Lucille Wolf & Donald E. Zarfas, Parents' Attitudes Toward Sterilization of Their
Mentally Retarded Children, 87 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 122, 128 (1982).
62. Id.
63. Though the Wolf-Zarfas study was conducted in Southwest Ontario, the study cor-
roborated the results of a prior study conducted in the United States. Wolf and Zarfas
specifically mention the corroboration of the Whitecraft-Jones (1974) study that found
85% of parents approving sterilization and the Bass (1967) study revealing that 60% of
parents approved sterilization. Id.
64. Id. at 127.
65. See Shaw, supra note 22, at 1076.
66. See N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 35-36, 35-37 (1995). It is important to note that while the
statute places an affirmative duty on public officials to petition for sterilization in some
circumstances, parents are authorized to petition without restrictions. Id.
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parents, their conflicts of interests can be couched in terms of "the public
good," the inheritability of the disease, inability to raise children, or the
"best interest" of the mentally disabled person.
The conflicts of interest may also lead to violations of autonomy during
the gathering of evidence to support the petition. Fischman asserts that
in order to meet evidentiary standards, mental health staff and parents
may "commit egregious invasions of the privacy of the mentally retarded
persons while attempting to gather enough evidence to support a sterili-
zation petition."67 Fischman's concern is warranted because the statute
fails to provide the mentally disabled individual with notice of the right to
counsel until after the evidence has been gathered and the petition has
been filed.68
The United States Supreme Court seems unconcerned. In 1984, the
Court let stand a 1968 decision upholding the legality of the state's deci-
sion to sterilize a mentally disabled individual.69 Elaine Riddick was
raped at the age of thirteen and became pregnant. North Carolina's prof-
fer of evidence asserted that Riddick was "mentally retarded, did poor
work in school, (and) was promiscuous."7 Two major facts warrant ques-
tioning the state's efforts in gathering evidence. First, the state ordered
her sterilization based on consent obtained from Riddick's father, who
the petitioners knew was mentally disabled and was not her legal guard-
ian.7 Second, Elaine Riddick attended and graduated from community
college as a young woman in her twenties.72
3. Exploring the Capacity to Enjoy Sexual Autonomy
If an individual is truly incapable of consent or objection, then steriliza-
tion will not violate her sexual autonomy as long as there has been a full
examination of her mental and emotional abilities and she is found to
lack capacity to enjoy or understand expressions of sexual autonomy. 73 It
is error to assume that a mentally disabled individual will not be capable
of enjoying other expressions of sexual autonomy just because she is
67. Fischman, supra note 23, at 1208.
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-45 (1995). It is also likely that the mentally disabled individ-
ual will not receive the benefit of an impartial guardian ad litem because the statute only
provides for one when there is no next of kin or legal guardian. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-40
(1995).




73. See Interview with Ruth Faden, supra note 4; Scott, supra note 6, at 831.
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found legally incompetent to make a medical decision regarding steriliza-
tion.74 Sexual autonomy interests that must be fully explored include in-
74. See Scott, supra note 6, at 837. Scott asserts that:
The ability to make an informed medical decision involves a level of cognitive
functioning that many mentally retarded persons lack. However, a person who is
unable to make this implementing decision might nonetheless be capable of mak-
ing the underlying decision to have or to forgo having a child. This decision is
fundamentally different from the medical sterilization decision and requires dif-
ferent capabilities.
Id. In addition, Scott states that a mildly disabled individual may have the ability to fulfill
basic parental responsibilities regardless of whether she is legally competent to make a
decision regarding sterilization. Id. As an example, Scott cites the case of a 35 year old
mentally disabled mother who visited the Forensic Psychiatry Unit at the University of
Virginia. This woman had experienced problems with contraceptives and was requesting
sterilization. Her competency was in question because of her inability to think abstractly
about the permanency of sterilization. Id. at 839. For a discussion of criteria used for deter-
mining when a mentally disabled parent is capable of fulfilling "basic parental responsibili-
ties," see infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
Professor John Grassi of Cambridge College backs Scott's opinion. He states that many
individuals may not be capable of formal "operational thought" involved in medical deci-
sions, but they may still be capable of exercising sufficient "practical intelligence" to pro-
vide basic parental care. Telephone Interview with John Grassi, Ph.D., Chair of Graduate
Program in Urban Education at Cambridge College, Cambridge, Mass. (Mar. 19, 1994)
(citing ROBERT J. STERNBERG PH.D., THE TRIARCHIC MIND (1988)).
Harvard Psychiatrist Mick Burglass supports Grassi and Scott:
Basic parenting most often involves issues of "single link proximal causation" (or
to use Grassi's words: "practical intelligence"). In "single link proximal, causa-
tion," an "effect" is close in time to the "event" that caused it. Medical decision
making involves "multiple link proximal causation;" this requires thought (what
Grassi terms: "operational thought") in situations involving large time spans be-
tween the actual "event" (such as providing consent) and the final "effect" (such
as a medical complication). In addition, "multiple link proximal causation" in-
volves added variables such as probabilities that given "effects" will occur after a
given "event." Therefore, when we consider "multiple link proximal causation,"
some Supreme Court Justices may not meet some doctor's standards regarding
competency over certain medical decisions.
Telephone Interview with Mick Burglass, M.D. (Psychiatry), M.P.H., M.S. (Neurophysi-
ology), M. Div., Professor at the Harvard Medical School Clinical and Research Faculty at
the Zinberg Center for Addiction Studies and former Professor at Harvard Divinity
School, Cambridge, Mass. (Apr. 10. 1994).
Robert Canto M.D. reveals exactly why consent to a medical operation like sterilization
involves "operational thought" (Burglass's "multiple link causation" thinking) far above
the level of thought required for basic parental care:
In assessing an individuals ability to consent, I give the individual a list of pros
and cons regarding the particular form of sterilization at issue. Most patients
have the pros in mind when they come to me. But most of the time they are not
fully aware of the cons. The cons associated with the procedure include: possibil-
ity of infection such as an abscess, chronic pain, fistula (abnormal communica-
tions between two organs), inadvertent tying of the ureters etc. I proceed to
explain what these cons are medically. Many "normal" patients are not able to
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terests in procreation, parenting one's own genetic child, and marriage. 7"
The North Carolina statute fails to guarantee full exploration of the
individual's capacity to enjoy expressions of sexual autonomy for three
reasons. First, the statute provides for an evidentiary hearing only if re-
quested by the mentally disabled individual, a petitioner, or another in-
terested party. 6 If an evidentiary hearing is never requested, then a
district court judge can order sterilization without a witness or evidence
additional to that which was presented with the petition.71 When a judge
assesses evidence in a nonconsensual sterilization petition without consid-
ering the relevant conflicts of interest, the autonomy of the individual
may be compromised. A full evidentiary hearing, requiring both a prof-
fer of evidence against sterilization, in conjunction with testimony by
court appointed impartial experts, could reveal the conflicts of interest
and would provide a greater safeguard for the sexual autonomy interest
of the individual. Maine employs this approach in its nonconsensual ster-
ilization cases.78
By not requiring a hearing in which an attorney must proffer evidence
against sterilization, North Carolina provides an opportunity for the men-
tally disabled individual's attorney to side with public officials or parents
and advocate that sterilization is in the individual's "best interest. '79
follow the anatomy and are not able to grasp the probabilities associated with
primary complications, their range of severity, and the numerous secondary com-
plications that can arise. I ask the patient to recite the pros and cons back to me.
Once the patient has made a decision, I analyze their thought process. If I believe
they have failed to analyze the situation thoroughly, I deny the sterilization on
grounds that the individual did not act competently in making their decision. I
have denied sterilization to several "normal adults" who have requested it. It is a
mistake to assume that because a mentally disabled individual is found legally
incompetent to make a medical decision, that he or she cannot provide adequate
parental care to a child. A parent can be taught that when a baby does not stop
crying its time to be brought to a hospital. This is a much simpler task than asking
the person to consider anatomy, physical and psychological effects, probabilities
of complications, etc.
Telephone Interview with Robert Canto M.D., former Professor of Surgery, University of
Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico (Apr. 8, 1994).
75. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 68 (definition of sexual
autonomy).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43 (1995).
77. Id.
78. See Cepko, supra note 29, at 152. Roberta Cepko asserts: "Reflecting a concern for
balance, [Maine] requires the respondent's attorney to ensure that 'information and evi-
dence in opposition to sterilization without informed consent is fully represented' at the
best interest hearing." Id. at 152 (emphasis omitted).
79. See id. at 152 n.201. Cepko recognizes this danger stating that "the absence of
[opposition to sterilization] in many of the cases is striking." Id. See also C.D.M. v. State,
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Under the North Carolina statute, this could result in no one requesting
an evidentiary hearing. Alternatively, if a court requires an evidentiary
hearing, then the only evidence proffered might be that which advocates
sterilization for the mentally disabled individual's "best interest." Under
both scenarios, the judge's decision would be based on the meager and
possibly biased evidence provided by the petitioning public officials and
parents.
Second, the statute permits sterilization without a full exploration of
the individual's capacity to adequately parent children as an expression of
their autonomy.8" Instead of requiring findings of fact that ensure that an
individual has the capacity to care for children, the statute allows vast
judicial discretion.81 "No standards are provided to aid in the judicial
determination of what degree of probability of unfitness.., is appropri-
ate. In other words, the statute permits limitless discretion by the peti-
627 P.2d 607, 609 n.4 (Alaska 1981) (At hearing, the guardian ad item had "reluctantly
argued that jurisdiction [to order sterilization] did not exist. On appeal, he ... now joins
C.D.M's parents in urging us to find that the jurisdiction does exist").
80. See Scott, supra note 6, at 837. On an ethical level, the position herein espoused
agrees with the claim that "competency to make a meaningful choice to procreate rests on
the individual's ability to fulfill the basic responsibilities of parenthood." Id. Thus, an
individual who is capable of caring for a child has a legally protectable interest in procrea-
tion, and [an] individual who lacks this capability does not. Id. at 838. This standard
asserts that an autonomy interest in parenting and procreation exists only if the individual
is capable of performing "basic parental responsibilities." This standard does not contem-
plate that the individual must fulfill the "basic responsibilities of parenthood" alone, as
long as assistance is available, See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. See also infra
notes 125-129 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria for assessing what constitutes
adequate parenting).
At this point, one could argue that the potential child's interests must be considered. A
response to this argument is that the standard of competency to make a meaningful choice,
elucidated by Scott above, already considers the potential child's interests. Under Scott's
standard, a potential child's interests carries enough weight that exercise of the potential
parent's autonomy interest in parenting and procreation is conditioned on the ability to
perform adequately basic parental responsibilities. This standard is very far along the ca-
pacity "continuum" elucidated by Ruth Faden. See Interview with Faden, supra note 4.
The standard requires more than a capacity to understand the given issue and to make a
preferential decision that considers her life view or plan. Id.
Yet, one could counter that ethical analysis should consider the potential child's prospec-
tive view on being born and possibly raised by mentally disabled parents. This argument
would have to assume that once a parent has shown that they can fulfill the "basic respon-
sibilities" of parenthood, a child may still have preferred not to have been raised, nor ever
conceived, by the mentally disabled parent. Until a study has been made, however, that
demonstrates that children of the mentally disabled actually hold these preferences, basing
sterilization on the potential child's perspective would constitute an infringement of sexual
autonomy on the basis of groundless speculation.
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43 (1995).
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tioner and the district court judge." 2 North Carolina case law reflects
the district court's "limitless discretion""3 in applying the varying subjec-
tive criteria that courts have used to determine an individual's capacity to
care for a child. In the case of In re Johnson, the court allowed the sterili-
zation of a mildly mentally disabled woman because she "exhibited emo-
tional immaturity, the absence of a sense of responsibility, a lack of
patience with children, and continuous nightly adventures with boy-
friends followed by daily sleep and bedrest." In contrast, the court in In
re Truesdell focused primarily on the mentally disabled individual's in-
ability to provide for the basic physical needs of the child.8 5
While a judge's subjective criteria for sterilization may vary, the rele-
vant cases share a common focus on the capacity of the mentally disabled
individual to raise a child absent outside help. North Carolina cases ap-
plying two "compelling state interests" have authorized sterilization of
individuals based on inability to care for a child. First, the state has an
interest in preventing the birth of children who will become burdens to
the state.86 Second, the state has a compelling interest in the welfare of
the unborn child.87 Although the first asserted interest may be sufficient
to preclude judicial inquiry into possible sources of public assistance,
there is no valid policy reason for lack of judicial inquiry into possible
private sources of assistance.
Private sources of assistance could include spouses and family members
willing to make a commitment to help raise the child, protect its welfare,
and prevent any burden to the state.88 Thus, by performing such an in-
quiry the court could preserve both state interests and the sexual auton-
omy of the mentally disabled individual.89
82. Shaw, supra note 22, at 1077.
83. Id.
84. In re Johnson, 263 S.E.2d at 809. When this evidence was challenged as irrelevant
to proper parenting, the court claimed broad discretion: "[tihe standard of admissibility
based on relevancy and materiality is of necessity elastic, and the evidence need not bear
directly on the issue as long as there is a reasonable, open and visible connection with the
subject of the lawsuit." Id. (emphasis omitted).
85. In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d at 808.
86. In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d at 312.
87. Id.
88. See generally In re Montgomery, 303 S.E.2d 324 (N.C. App. 1983), rev'd, 316
S.E.2d 246 (N.C. 1984) (vacating an order terminating the rights of two mentally disabled
parents when the petitioners failed to show that the parents as a couple provided inade-
quate physical and emotional care).
89. One could argue that as a matter of policy, when family members petition the
court for sterilization, or join the sterilization petition, courts should not waste time and
effort inquiring into the possibility of family members providing assistance. This position,
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This position is consistent with New Jersey's requirement that a trial
court assess whether an individual, together with a spouse, would be able
to care for a child. 9° Inquiry into private sources of assistance could also
include private sector institutions who may teach and oversee the men-
tally disabled individual. Scott asserts that there has been a growing rec-
ognition that some mentally disabled individuals can function as parents,
and that there is a new focus being placed on supportive services and
training in parenting skills.91 Another commentator states that "research
indicates that mentally retarded persons can learn to overcome virtually
any deficiency in parenting abilities." 92 Courts presently may not de-
mand inquiries into available private sources of assistance. Nevertheless,
such inquiries are required based on constitutional grounds and ethical
concerns for sexual autonomy.
Third, the statute and corresponding case law prescribe sterilization
without providing for any exploration of the mentally disabled individ-
ual's sexual autonomy interest in marriage. 93 Cepko asserts that "evi-
however, relies on the speculation that family members act or believe similarly regarding
the issue of sterilization. Research has not unveiled a study on individual family members
agreeing or dissenting regarding sterilization of another family member. Thus, inquiry into
possible aid from nuclear and extended family members is warranted even when certain
family members petition for sterilization.
90. See In re Grady, 426 A.2d 476, 483 (N.J. 1981). The Hastings Center, Institute of
Society, Ethics and Life Sciences Behavior Control Research Group asserts:
Another factor that must be taken into consideration is that parental functions
are often shared by a couple. If one parent lacks the competence to perform cer-
tain parental tasks, the other parent may be capable of carrying them out. Conse-
quently, in considering competence to be a parent, it may be inappropriate to
focus exclusively on the capabilities of the mentally incompetent person while
ignoring the possible competence of the partner.
MENTAL RETARDATION AND STERILIZATION 96 (Ruth Macklin & Willard Gaylin eds.,
1981).
91. Scott, supra note 6, at 816 (citing Rosenberg & McTate, Intellectually Handicapped
Mothers: Problems and Perspectives, CHILDREN TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 24; Madsen,
Parenting Classes for the Mentally Retarded, 17 MENTAL RETARDATION 195 (1979)).
92. See Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, And the Men-
tally Disabled Parent, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1201 (1990) (providing an in depth look at the
true parenting capacities of the mentally disabled).
93. In applying the analytical framework elucidated by Ruth Faden, this article takes
the position that an autonomy interest in marriage should be found when an individual is
capable of understanding the issue of marriage and can express a preference regarding the
present or future marital status. See Interview with Ruth Faden, supra note 4. This stan-
dard requires "capacities" on a much lower threshold on the "continuum," see Interview
with Ruth Faden, supra note 4, than the "capacities" required to find an autonomy interest.
in procreation and parenting of one's genetic child. See supra note 80. The higher "capaci-
ties" requirements for an autonomy interest in procreation and parenting of one's genetic
child are rooted in protecting the potential child's interest. Id. The capacity of the mentally
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dence indicates that men and women with mental disabilities do in fact
marry."'94 She argues that "[s]ome individuals would not consider mar-
riage to an infertile person, so eliminating this potentially critical aspect
of desirability in a mate results in a potentially smaller pool of partners
for [the sterilized]." 95 Cepko concludes that to "the extent that sterility
restricts the marital possibilities of a mentally disabled woman," it in-
vades that person's constitutional right to marry.96 Although the consti-
tutional issue is beyond the scope of this article, sterilization without a
full investigation of the individual's interest in marriage unethically in-
vades sexual autonomy.
Inquiry into potential assistance from a spouse or other private source
of assistance in child rearing can serve to protect the mentally disabled
individual's sexual autonomy interests of procreation and parenting one's
own genetic child, as well as marriage. If such an inquiry revealed the
ability to care for a child with the aid of a spouse, then North Carolina's
"compelling interest" in child care would be met. Such an inquiry would
thus provide protection against the impact of sterilization on marriage
(cited by Cepko above).
C Autonomy and the Poor
Nonconsensual sterilization may infringe not only upon sexual auton-
omy, but may also invade a mentally disabled individual's autonomy on a
psychological level.97 Events affecting bodily integrity have reciprocal
psychological effects. 98 Before sterilization surgery is performed, the
disabled individual to understand the issue of marriage and to express a preference regard-
ing their present or future marital status has been well established.
94. Cepko, supra note 29, at 144.
95. Id.
96. Id. Summarizing a previous survey of mentally disabled individuals who had been
sterilized, Cepko states: "The most common ground for disapproval of the sterilization was
that the surgery would 'prevent [them] ... from passing as normal, particularly if she or he
is contemplating marriage to a normal person, and' infertility was viewed as 'preventing
the . . .[person] from assuming the normal roles of motherhood and fatherhood."' Id.
(quoting G. Sabagh & R.B. Edgerton, Sterilized Mental Defectives Look at Eugenic Sterili-
zation, 9 EUGENICS Q. 213 (1962)).
97. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 2, at 68 (acknowledging that autonomy
can be compromised on the psychological level: "autonomous persons sometimes make
nonautonomous choices imposed by illness or depression"). This section of the article as-
serts that by denying a choice of physician to the mentally disabled who cannot afford their
own physician, these individuals are not afforded the opportunity to minimize restraints on
autonomy from fear, anxiety, panic, depression, or other reactions to the sterilization
procedure.
98. Telephone Interview with Eduard Azcarate, Ph.D., Clinical Psychologist and for-
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mentally disabled individual may be burdened psychologically by fear,
anxiety, and may even show signs of panic.99 After the surgery has been
performed, the individual may feel a deep sense of loss, depression, and
even trauma. 100 Modern psychology categorizes these postoperative ef-
fects as "somatopsychic."' 0 ' Invasions of the body through sterilization
mer Assistant Professor of Adolescent Medicine at George Washington University Medi-
cal School, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 18, 1994). For an in depth discussion on how effects on
the body have reciprocal psychological effects, see Michael Blumenfield, M.D. & Troy L.
Thompson II, M.D., The Psychological Reactions to Physical Illness, in UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN HEALTH AND ILLNESS 48-59 (Richard C. Simmons, M.D. ed., 1985).
99. Interview with Eduard Azcarate, supra note 98. See also Blumenfield & Thomp-
son, supra note 98, at 48-59 (providing an in-depth discussion on psychological burdens
experienced by patients before surgery).
100. Interview with Eduard Azcarate, supra note 98. See also Ronald D. Franks, M.D.,
The Difficult Patient, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN HEALTH AND ILLNESS,
supra note 98, at 101, 111-112. The writings of Franks corroborate Azcarate's statement.
Regarding the psychological effects of sterilization by hysterectomy, Franks writes:
A woman's psychological response to the loss of the uterus is quite varied and
depends on many factors, including the reason for the operation, the woman's
acceptance of its necessity, her age, her psychological maturity, and the stability
of her sense of her femininity.... Her husband's attitude is also extremely impor-
tant. Some men reject the woman as no longer truly feminine because of their
own unconscious fears as well as their desires for children .... Even under the
best of circumstances, complete psychological recovery following a hysterectomy
may take many months. This is because much psychological response is based
upon an unconscious thinking which does not have a logical basis. For example,
any operation may be viewed unconsciously, as the punishment. This is especially
true of operations on the sexual apparatus. The person views the organic pathol-
ogy as a punishment for sexual behavior. Great guilt is still attached to sexual
thoughts and sexual activity by many people. Physicians must be aware of this,
and should take steps to prevent a depressed patient's sexual behavior from being
severely inhibited.
Id.
Regarding sterilization through vasectomy, Franks writes that "[t]here are more fre-
quent adverse psychological reactions to vasectomy than is generally recognized." Id. at
110. Robert Dickes and John L. Fleming add:
The use of surgical methods [such as vasectomy] requires a pernianent shift in the
person's self image, which normally induces an awareness of sexuality and the
ability to be fertile. This ability to be fertile is lost in the operative procedure.
Some individuals cannot tolerate this even though they may consciously seek the
operation. Careful presurgical evaluation of the patient is needed.
Jonathan Dickes, M.D. & John L. Fleming, M.D., Sexuality in General Medical Practice, in
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN HEALTH AND ILLNESS, supra note 98, at 349, 353.
101. Stedman's Medical Dictionary defines the "somatopsychic" as: "Relating to the
body-mind relationship; the study of the effects of the body upon the mind, as opposed to
psychosomatic." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1435 (25th ed. 1990). Eduard Az-
carate explains the term somatopsychic: "The term 'soma' means body, and the term
'psyche' refers to the mind. The term describes how changes in the body affect the mind.
As an example, people who have diabetes experience mood changes when blood sugar
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have had well documented negative psychological effects on mentally dis-
abled individuals.
10 2
If, after a full exploration, an individual is found incapable of consent
and having no interests in sexual autonomy (e.g. the individual cannot
have children, is incapable of a marriage relationship, etc.), then the indi-
vidual should be granted a full opportunity to minimize psychological ef-
fects that will compromise her autonomy. In order to minimize this
invasion, patients should be allowed to choose the physician who will per-
form the sterilization operation. °3 If a patient is unable to make such a
choice, then parents or guardians should choose the physician because
levels fluctuate. Another example of a somatopsychic response is the deep sense of loss
felt by amputees after surgery." Interview with Eduard Azcarate, supra note 98.
102. Psychological effects stemming from sterilization include "great anxiety about be-
ing considered different," or "an intense feeling of deprivation at the thought of not being
able to bear children," and "a degraded status of the self." Cepko, supra note 29, at 152
(citing Sabagh & Edgerton, supra note 96).
103. The word "minimize" recognizes that once the state imposes sterilization, there
will be an invasion of the body, and thus a reciprocal psychological effect. The choice of
physician, however, may allow the mentally disabled individual to minimize the psycholog-
ical impact of sterilization by providing a sense of comfort or trust in a physician. Inter-
view with Eduard Azcarate, supra note 98.
A good rapport between patient and physician is especially important as regards
the mentally disabled. There are two psychological benefits in providing a choice
of physician. First, there will be a sense of "continuity" of support, of remaining
somewhat in control of the situation, that the individual is given from the time
before the operation to the recovery period that follows. This "continuity" may
reduce psychological trauma that may follow the invasion of the body by the sur-
geon. Second, it is an enormous psychological benefit to allow the mentally dis-
abled to choose a physician with whom they feel "comfortable." Feelings of
"comfort" or "discomfort" are magnified in the mentally disabled individual and
they often react violently to people they dislike. A "comfort" relationship with a
physician will allow the mentally disabled individual to feel less invaded, less fear
and less anxiety before the operation. This will preserve more of their psycholog-
ical autonomy.
Id. See Michael Blumenfield, M.D., The Participants in the Doctor Patient Relationship, in
THE BASIC MODELS OF THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 98, at 19. Dr.
Blumenfield provides an in-depth discussion on the psychological effects of physician char-
acteristics upon patients, as well as an example of how a physician imposed upon a patient
who does not feel "comfortable" with that physician can cause adverse psychological
effects.
Sometimes a single characteristic of the doctor can have a tremendous emotional
significance to the patient ... For example, a black patient living in a ghetto may
have very distinct emotional reaction to a white physician based on previous ex-
periences involving white authority figures. Such feelings could include fear,
hopelessness, and anger and they will hinder the medical treatment and the abil-
ity of the patient to cooperate with the physician.
Id. at 23.
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they have an interest in the psychological well:being of their child."°4
The North Carolina statute provides such a choice for those who can
afford a private physician, but not for those unable to afford a physi-
cian. 105 Mentally disabled individuals whose families can't afford a pri-
vate physician will undergo sterilization from a physician chosen by the
public official who petitioned for the sterilization.'0 6 The effect of this
scheme is to allow the state to impose sterilization without giving individ-
uals from lesser means a chance to minimize the psychological invasion of
autonomy that can be caused by the procedure.
In order to maximize autonomy, the state should not only provide a
choice of physician to all mentally disabled individuals that it orders ster-
ilized, but it should also pay for those sterilizations. 07 If the state orders
a sterilization and parents are forced to pay, then a financial conflict of
interest may lead parents to "shop around" and base their choice of phy-
104. The court must order sterilization by the least drastic or burdensome means. See
In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793, 811 (NC.' 1976). Once the judge prescribes the least intru-
sive sterilization method, the court eliminates possible conflicts of interest that may other-
wise lead parents to choose selectively only physicians who will perform the method of
sterilization they request.
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-38 (1995). This paper does not question the constitutionality
of treating the mentally disabled poor differently from those with sufficient wealth to af-
ford a physician. The courts have turned away from earlier intimations that wealth-based
classifications should receive strict constitutional scrutiny. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 743 (1991). Instead, this paper raises the ethical issue surrounding
the greater invasion of autonomy faced by those mentally disabled individuals who are not
afforded a choice of physician.
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-38.
107. The ethical questions presented by imposing a physician upon a patient whom the
state has ordered sterilized is much different from therecent abortion cases where the
court held that the state was not required to pay for the abortion procedures. See Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1990); Harris v. McRae, 440 U.S. 297 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977). Those cases involved questions of subsidies for rights that were constitu-
tionally protected. In contrast, these cases involve questions of a state's ethical obligation
to pay for a physician, chosen by the patient, once the state has imposed a procedure upon
the individual.
On a legal level, however, some may argue that the state fulfills its obligation to the
mentally disabled individuals of lesser means by providing a qualified physician to perform
the operation. Providing a qualified physician, however, is not an adequate solution to the
ethical issue raised by denying certain mentally disabled patients an opportunity to mini-
mize psychological effects associated with sterilization. In order to minimize psychological
effects associated with sterilization, a patient requires something in addition to a medically
qualified individual provided by the state. The mentally disabled individual requires a
qualified physician with whom she feels "comfortable." See Interview with Eduard Az-
carate, supra note 98. Arguing on an ethical level, once the state imposes the psychological
burden associated with sterilization, it should pay for the choice of physician that will mini-
mize the invasion of psychological autonomy.
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sician on expense rather than on psychological compatibility with their
child.
D. Invasions of Female Autonomy
1. Objectification
The statutory language and its corresponding judicial interpretations
objectify the mentally disabled woman. The root of this objectification
lies in the language of the statute requiring a judge to order sterilization
when the individual would be likely to procreate a child with genetic "de-
ficiencies"' or one that she may not be able to care for.' °8 Case law has
interpreted this language to require evidence that the mentally disabled
individual will "voluntarily or otherwise engage in sexual activity likely to
cause impregnation and that the individual is unable or unwilling to con-
trol procreation by alternative birth control or contraceptive
methods."'0 9
Although this judicial interpretation attempts to safeguard autonomy
interests by requiring certain evidence, it makes clear that avoiding socie-
tal burdens associated with "pregnancy" is the primary purpose of the
statutory provision. 10 Thus, although a straightforward reading of the
statute suggests that it applies to both men and women, the judicial focus
on "pregnancy" imposes the greatest burdens on mentally disabled wo-
men. One possible burden is that mentally disabled women will be the
subject of most sterilization petitions."' This burden might be summed
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-43.
109. In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d at 793, 803, 806; see also North Carolina Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children v. State, 420 F. Supp. 451, 457 (1976).
110. As case law has previously stated, these burdens on society include the procreation
of genetically "defective" children or future wards of the state. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 20 and 45-46.
One could counter that the judicial interpretation is primarily aimed at preventing sexual
activity and pregnancy for the moral and mental health of the individual, rather than to
prevent societal burdens. There exists a separate statutory provision, however, that autho-
rizes sterilization for the mental or moral best interests of the patient. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 35-39 (1995). Furthermore, in In re Truesdell, the court stated that it was specifically
addressing the state interest in "the prevention of the birth of a child to a person who
would be incapable of discharging the responsibilities of parenthood." 304 S.E.2d at 805.
The court stated in North Carolina Association for Retarded Persons v. State that it was
applying the judicial interpretation to the provision found in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-43
because: the person "would be likely, unless sterilized to procreate a child, or children
which probably would have serious physical, mental or nervous disease[s]." 420 F. Supp. at
455.
111. Although the actual statistics on the gender of the nonconsensually sterilized in
North Carolina are not available, it'is apparent that the majority of sterilization cases na-
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up by the following message sent to mentally disabled women by this
judicial interpretation of the statute: one aspect of your biology has no
worth, burdens society, and must be removed. This message objectifies
the mentally disabled woman.
Objectification involves ascribing the features of an object to a living
being. Shapiro states that one feature of being an object is that "its full
value can be exhaustively captured by specifying the uses to which it can
be put." '112 Shapiro asserts that because the full value can be captured,
the object is then not viewed as autonomous or worthy of corresponding
duties. 1 3 Thus, one could argue that the court ascribes the mentally dis-
abled woman a "full value" less than what is worthy of reproduction by
denying her the use of her body for procreation. As an object, the wo-
man's "full value" is deemed insufficient to warrant preservation of her
sexual autonomy. Under the current statutory scheme, her "full value" is
also deemed unworthy of a duty to inquire into possible sources of pri-
vate assistance or training to help her properly raise children." 4
Shapiro adds that one method of objectification involves the manipula-
tion of physical and mental functions without a "disorder-based justifica-
tion.""' 5 Sterilization of the mentally disabled woman could be seen as a
manipulation of the physical and mental functions associated with preg-
nancy and menstruation. Although the state's interests may meet legal
"compelling interest" standards, they do not meet a "disorder-based justi-
fication" standard. As was mentioned, the scientific basis underlying a
state's eugenic interest in preventing the birth of "defective" children has
largely been discredited." 6 In addition, the state's interest in protecting
its purse from future wards of the state is groundless without inquiry into
possible private sources of assistance from spouses, family, or institutions.
2. Negative Cultural Views of Women
Lack of evidentiary standards in the statute and case law may allow
cultural stereotypes held by parents, public officials, and judges to play a
role in the sterilization decision; thus, it potentially infringes upon the
tionwide have involved women. Cepko, supra note 29, at 138. Interestingly, one of the
North Carolina cases involved a male. See In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (N.C. 1976).
The remainder of the cases involved women.
112. Michael H. Shapiro, Fragmenting and Reassembling the-World: Of Flying Squirrels,
Augmented Persons, and Other Monsters, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 351 (1990).
113. Id.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
115. Shapiro, supra note 112, at 351.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
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sexual autonomy of the mentally disabled. Cepko asserts that there is a
history of cultural preoccupation with sterilization of women deemed un-
fit to raise children, but that there is no such preoccupation with male
parenting. 117 She asserts that of several dozen modern sterilization
cases, only two involved sterilization of men.118 The results from the
Wolf and Zarfas study mentioned above corroborate this view. The study
revealed that parents of mentally disabled males viewed their abilities in
the area of marriage and child rearing more positively than did parents of
mentally disabled females." 9
The case of In re Johnson exemplifies the infusion of a cultural stereo-
type into the sterilization decision. In assessing Tempie Johnson's capac-
ity to parent, the court relied on evidence of her "morals [and] sexual
activity," specifically "focusing on nightly adventures with boyfriends.'
120
The court also considered evidence that Tempie "was able to help clean
the house but that she did not have the patience to cook.' 12' Finally, the
court stated that in past years Tempie had shown signs of impatience with
children, immaturity, and irresponsibility. 122 In considering the evidence,
the court did not inquire into the possibility that Tempie's mate may pre-
fer to cook or clean. 123 The court's opinion resounds of stereotypical and
antiquated views regarding the role of women in society by applying
cooking, cleaning, and sexual morality standards to Tempie. Further-
more, immaturity and irresponsibility provide little if any aid in predict-
ing Tempie's parental skills given the fact that the petition to sterilize was
brought when she was barely twenty years old.' 24
Comparing the court's standards, with the gender-neutral standards de-
veloped by the Hastings Center Behavioral Control Research Group, fur-
ther exposes the gender bias in In re Johnson .12  In determining parental
117. Cepko, supra note 29, at 138.
118. Id. at 140.
119. Wolf & Zarfas, supra note 61, at 126.
120. In re Johnson, 263 S.E.2d at 809.
121. Id. at 807.
122. Id. at 809.
123. Id. at 807. At the time of the case Tempie had a mate who had expressed a desire
to marry her. Id.
124. Though Tempie Johnson was 23 at the time of this case, two years prior she had
already exercised an appeal after a district court had ordered her sterilization. See In re
Johnson, 243 S.E.2d 386 (N.C. App. 1978).
125. See Interview with Mick Burglass, supra note 74. Although the Hastings Center
standards were developed in 1981, Harvard Psychiatrist Mick Burglass asserts that: "The
Hastings Center's standards are fundamentally correct and still hold today." Id. See also
infra note 127 (Professor Burglass suggesting that one of the standards leaves room for
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unfitness, two of the six factors considered by the Hastings Center in-
clude "inconsistency in value system" and an "inability to establish inter-
personal relationships., 126 The words "inconsistency in value system"
has two proper interpretations. The words may indicate a concern for
contradiction between values within the system, or a concern for the in-
consistent application of values to the child. Under either interpretation,
this standard leaves little discretion for moral judgments upon the actual
values and norms within the given system. In the case of In re Johnson,
however, the court focused only upon the propriety of Tempie's values,
rather than focusing on "inconsistencies" in either the content or applica-
tion of Tempie's value system. In doing so the court imposed the above
mentioned sexual morality and housekeeping norms that it found to be
consistent with the role of women in society.
127
The words "inability to establish interpersonal relationships" do not
call for moral judgments regarding the nature of relationships. Rather,
courts to apply them in such a manner as to label mentally disabled parents unfit, although
they may be adequate parents).
126. See Macklin & Gaylin, supra note 90, at 95-96. Several members of the group
oppose employing these criteria until there is sufficient effort to teach the mildly retarded,
like Tempie, to function in each of these six areas. Id. at 96.
Three of the remaining factors considered by the Hastings Center are lack of language
skills, pervasive reality distortion, and inability to communicate essential survival informa-
tion. Id. at 95. The text of the case did not mention the consideration of any evidence
remotely similar to these factors. It is likely, however, that Tempie surpassed these stan-
dards given the fact that the text suggests that her disability was mild.
Persistent malevolence toward a child is the remaining factor indicating parental unfit-
ness. Id. One might argue that Tempie's lack of patience could constitute "malevolence"
during a moment of lost patience; however, it would have been difficult to argue that the
evidence offered met a "persistent malevolence" standard. Evidence in the case only men-
tions a former statement by Tempie that in her youth she had lost patience with children,
and a statement by her former foster mother that Tempie "was not interested in children
and paid no attention to them." In re Johnson, 263 S.E.2d at 807. The importance of this
statement is limited, however, given Tempie's other statement that she "would like to have
children." Id. In addition, it should be noted that her foster mother's statements were
made from observation of Tempie's behavior as a youth. Id.
127. See Interview with Mick Burglass, supra note 74. Burglass asserts:
The words "inconsistency in value system" can be misapplied by courts to mean
an inconsistency between the mentally disabled person's values and the values
held by the "mainstream." Such an interpretation is reminiscent of the eugenic
programs of Nazi Germany where individuals were sterilized because their values
were not consistent with that of the state. Sterilization based on an inconsistency
between an individual's values and those of the state raises a freedom of religion
question.
Id. Considering Professor Burglass's view, one could argue that the court in In re Johnson
made the same inappropriate comparison between the values of Tempie Johnson and soci-
etal values (as viewed by the court).
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this standard focuses on the actual "ability" or "capacity" to establish a
relationship. Tempie Johnson had several established relationships at the
time of her case. Indicators of her capacity to establish relationships in-
clude "two boyfriends, one of which wanted to marry her, [and Tempie's
indication that] she would like to have children.'1 2 8 Instead of consider-
ing her "ability" to establish relationships, the court judged the moral
propriety of her relationships. As stated above, the court held that evi-
dence concerning Tempie's "morals," "nightly adventures with boy-
friends," and "attitudes about birth control" were relevant and material
considerations regarding parental fitness.' 29 Such considerations, how-
ever, speak less of the individual's capacity to care for a child and more of
the judge's beliefs regarding the role of women in relationships.
III. A PROPOSED MODEL
The North Carolina statute should be rewritten. The eugenics-based
provisions of the statute should be removed. The new statute should fo-
cus on protecting the autonomy of the mentally disabled individual.
In order to fully protect autonomy, the current system should be re-
placed by a system employing an independent ethics committee and
mandatory full evidentiary hearings. Ethics committees are designed to
assist physicians, families, and the mentally disabled in the sterilization
process. 130 Committee members are chosen as independent professionals
who are experts in topics such as advocacy for the mentally disabled, disa-
bility law, sexuality of the disabled, reproductive health, and special
education.'
31
The new statute should provide that all requests for nonconsensual
sterilization of a mentally disabled individual must be made to an ethics
committee. The committee would then research the request and decide
whether to petition a court for sterilization. One advantage of using an
independent ethics committee is the elimination of the current conflicts
of interests that may underlie petitions for sterilization in North Carolina.
By eliminating conflicts of interest, an ethics committee can also pro-
vide protection against violations of autonomy when evidence is gathered
128. In re Johnson, 263 S.E.2d at 807.
129. Id. at 809.
130. See Thomas E. Elkins, M.D., The Use of Societally Based Ethics\Advisory Commit-
tee to Aid in Decisions to Sterilize Mentally Handicapped Patients, 1 ADOLESCENT & PEDI-
ATRIC GYNECOLOGY 190 (1988). The University of Michigan has a committee whose
primary goal is to maximize patient autonomy. Id. at 191.
131. Id.
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for the sterilization decision. The ethics committee should be limited to
making certain findings of fact during the research process. First, the
committee must explore the mentally disabled individual's capacity to
consent or object to sterilization. The use of an ethics committee would
guarantee that capacity to consent is fully explored by qualified expert
members of the committee. 132 If the individual were found to be compe-
tent to make the sterilization decision, then the individual's consent or
objection would control.
Second, if an individual were found incapable of consent or objection,
then the committee would fully explore her sexual autonomy interests in
procreation, parenting her own genetic child, and marriage. If the indi-
vidual were found to have an autonomy interest in any one of these ex-
pressions, then the committee should reject the nonconsensual
sterilization request. 133 An autonomy interest in procreation or parent-
ing one's own child must be acknowledged, if the individual together with
a spouse will be able to provide the minimum requirements necessary for
adequate child care. 34 The interest should also be acknowledged if the
individual is capable of learning the fundamentals of parenting. This
standard attempts to remove some of the subjective input and accompa-
nying biases mentioned above that are present when gauging autonomy
interests.
Opinions of public officials, family members, and physicians may be
solicited during the exploration of these autonomy interests. These opin-
ions should be viewed, however, as secondary to the findings made by the
132. Currently, the North Carolina statute does not require an assessment by a quali-
fied expert of the capacity to consent. Instead, the task is left to the public official petition-
ing for sterilization. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
133. One could argue that even though an individual has an interest in reproductive
autonomy, nonconsensual sterilization may preserve a greater autonomy interest in free-
dom from psychological or physical burdens associated with procreation and menstruation.
This argument, however, involves a subjective weighing of the burdens of reproduction or
menstruation on the individual versus the benefits of procreation, parenting, or marriage.
Thus, the argument is a "best interests" argument in disguise, rather than an autonomy
argument. The autonomy model presented here, however, differs from autonomy models
that ban all nonconsensual sterilization. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 67. The autonomy
model presented acknowledges that an individual may have no autonomy interest in pro-
creation, parenting, or marriage. For example, an individual will have no autonomy inter-
est in parenting or procreation if these activities have no meaning to her. See Scott, supra
note 6, at 831. In such a situation, sterilization may be consistent with autonomy.
134. This standard melds the mandated inquiry into spousal support for raising a child
in In re Grady with the position that "the individual who is capable of caring for a child has
a legally protectable interest in procreation, and that the individual who lacks this capabil-
ity does not." Scott, supra note 6, at 831.
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committee. 135 In this manner, the role of conflicts of interest will be
limited.
If the committee finds that the individual does not have any of the
aforementioned interests in sexual autonomy, then it must explore the
full medical and psychological ramifications of pregnancy or menstrua-
tion. The committee must then explore whether less drastic contraceptive
means of preventing pregnancy or menstruation exist.' 36 If the commit-
tee of experts finds these means to be inadequate, then it should explore
the least drastic form of sterilization. If the committee finds that the least
drastic means of sterilization would prevent physical and psychological
disease associated with pregnancy, then it might petition a court for
sterilization.'37
Once a petition is filed with a court, the statute should provide for a
135. See Elkins, supra note 130, at 191. Under the University of Michigan model, the
opinions of family and physicians are of secondary concern to patient well-being in the
decision making process. Id. Note that the autonomy model presented here diverges from
Scott's model at this point. Scott asserts that when an individual is unable to consent and
has no reproductive autonomy interest, the sterilization decision should be left to parents.
See Scott, supra note 6, at 853-54. Under the model presented here, however, sterilization
can only be recommended to a court by the ethics committee.
136. See PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER NORTHERN NEW JERSEY, THE NOR-
PLANT SUBDERMAL CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANT 1 (November 1992). One alternative to
sterilization that should be considered is the Norplant Subdermal Contraceptive Implant.
Planned Parenthood of Greater Northern New Jersey describes the contraceptive as
follows:
Norplant is a long-acting, highly effective, reversible contraceptive method. Six
thin, flexible capsules are inserted through a large needle just under the skin of
the woman's upper inner arm. The capsules of silicone rubber tubing contain a
synthetic progestin, levonorgestrel, and deliver adequate hormones for five years
of contraception. The pregnancy rate for Norplant is less than 1 per 100 women
per year, which is lower than for the pill and comparable to surgical steriliza-
tion .... The method is reversed when the implants are removed.
Id.
The Norplant Subdermal Contraceptive Implant, however, may not be suitable for some
mentally disabled patients. Contraindications such as thromboembolic disorders, abnormal
genital bleeding, liver disease, breast cancer, migraines, abnormal liver functioning, bleed-
ing disorders, hypertension, diabetes, depression, epilepsy, gall bladder disease, and renal
disease may preclude the use of the contraceptive. Id. at 2-3. An interview with Planned
Parenthood gynecologist Majin Faxas revealed that one of the major disadvantages to Nor-
plant is that it may cause heavy vaginal bleeding and severe migraine headaches. Interview
with Majin Mediano Faxas, M.D., Planned Parenthood Participating Physician, New Jersey
(Mar. 28, 1993). Dr. Faxas revealed that such symptoms may necessitate removal of the
implants. Id.
137. Note that this decision does not involve a subjective weighing of the competing
interests described in the "disguised best interest" approach. See discussion, supra note
133. The decision to sterilize will be based on medical and psychological prognosis of dis-
ease associated with pregnancy and menstruation.
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full evidentiary hearing. The court should then appoint an attorney who
would have access to court appointed experts, and who would present
evidence against the sterilization petition. Such a hearing should protect
sexual autonomy in two ways. First, because the composition of an ethics
committee would be a controversial subject, 3 8 and concerns such as gen-
der bias might stem from an unbalanced composition, an opposing attor-
ney might reveal bias in the decisionmaking process by presenting her
own "gender neutral" experts. Second, an opposing attorney might ob-
ject to evidence gathered outside of the prescribed research limitations.
This could expose improper committee conclusions regarding the client's
ability to consent or object, or her reproductive autonomy interests.
If the court determines that nonconsensual sterilization is appropriate,
then the individual should be given a choice of physicians who would
perform the procedure. In order to maximize autonomy, the state should
provide a choice of physician to all mentally disabled individuals it orders
to be sterilized pursuant to the new statute. The ability to choose a physi-
cian would provide an opportunity for the mentally disabled to minimize
the psychological invasion of autonomy that can result from the proce-
dure. If the individual is incapable of making such a choice, then her
parents or guardians should choose the physician. Parents or guardians
are most likely to be aware of the individual's preferences, and to have an
interest in her psychological well-being. The state should pay for steril-
izations authorized under the statute in order to prevent parents or
guardians from "shopping around" for physicians based on price instead
of the psychological needs of the mentally disabled individual.
IV. CONCLUSION
The North Carolina statute, and the manner in which it has been ap-
plied through case law, fails to protect adequately the sexual autonomy of
the mentally disabled individual. North Carolina continues to cling to the
past with statutory provisions based on eugenic theory that fail to provide
adequate procedures for safeguarding the sexual autonomy of the men-
tally disabled. The results are violations of mentally disabled individual's
sexual autonomy interests in procreation, parenting one's own genetic
child, and in marriage. In addition, the statute has a disproportionate
impact on the autonomy of the mentally disabled poor and mentally dis-
abled women. One solution would be the combined use of ethics com-
138. Elkins, supra note 130, at 190.
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mittees and. full evidentiary hearings to provide adequate protection for
the autonomy interests of the mentally disabled.

